MY TRIAL AS A WAR CRIMINAL*

I

LEO SzmiAum

WAS just about to lock the door of my hotel room and go to bed

when there was a knock on the door and there stood a Russian officer
and a young Russian civilian. I had expected something of this sort
ever since the President signed the terms of unconditional surrender and
the Russians landed a token occupation force in New York. The officer
handed me something that looked like a warrant and said that I was under arrest as a war criminal on the basis of my activities during the Second
World War in connection with the atomic bomb. There was a car waiting
outside and they told me that they were going to take me to the Brookhaven National Laboratory on Long Island. Apparently, they were rounding up all the scientists who had ever worked in the field of atomic energy.
Once we were in the car the young man introduced himself and told
me that he was a physicist as well as a member of the Moscow Chapter of
the Communist Party. I had never heard his name before and I was never
able to remember it thereafter. He was obviously very eager to talk. He
told me that he and the other Russian scientists were all exceedingly sorry
that the strain of the virus which had been used had killed such a disproportionately large number of children. It was very fortunate, he said, that
the first attack was limited to New Jersey and that the early cessation of
hostilities made attacks of larger scope unnecessary. According to planso he said--stocks of this virus were merely held in reserve for an emergency. Another virus differing by five further mutational steps had been
in the stage of pilot plant production, and it was this improved virus
which was meant to be used in case of war. It would not affect children at
all and would kill predominantly men between twenty and forty. Owing
to the premature outbreak of the war, however, the Russian government
found itself forced to use the stocks which it had on hand.
He said that all the scientists arrested would be given a chance to go to
Russia, in which case they need not stand trial as war criminals; but that
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ifI should elect to stand for trial he personally hoped that I would be exonerated and that afterwards I would be willing to collaborate with the
Russians here in the United States.
He said that the Russians were very anxious to get the support of people
other than the American Communists for a stable political regime in the
United States which would collaborate with them. Since they now had the
support of the Communists anyway, he explained, they would rather bestow their favors on those whose cooperation was not yet assured. "We
shall, of course, lean on the Communists for the next few months," he
said, "but, in the long run, dissatisfied elements who are used to conspiracy would not be relied on by us." "It is difficult to work with fellows
who have no sense of humor," he added as an afterthought.
He told me that no scientist would be forced to go to Russia and that
no one who was innocent need go there for fear of having to stand trial as
a war criminal, because, he said, Russia would do everything in her power
to make the trials fair and impartial. "The outcome of a bona fide trial,"
he added somewhat illogically, "is, of course, always something of a toss
UP.
He told me that he expected that Russia would, within a fortnight,
change her position on the question of world government; that she would
come out in favor of it, in principle, and that she would press for immediate strengthening of the United Nations. The tribunal which was being
assembled to try war criminals would not be Russian-dominated, he said,
but would rather be composed of representatives of all nations which were
not at war with Russia.
I was surprised to hear him say that he expected Great Britain to delegate the Lord Chief Justice to sit on the tribunal, and, frankly, I did not
believe him then, though, of course, this was technically not impossible
since the coalition cabinet had declared Britain's neutrality twenty-four
hours before the outbreak of the war. His prediction was confirmed, however, the following morning when the newspapers reported the speech of
the British Prime Minister who had said that Great Britain, having participated in the Nuremberg trials, could not now refuse her participation
without being guilty of displaying a double standard of morality. The information which I received from this young man proved to be most valuable to me bec'ause it gave me time to make up my mind as to what line I
would want to follow.
As far as going to Russia was concerned, my mind was made up. Having
been raised in Hungary, I had lived in Germany and in England before I
settled in the United States, and that is as much migration as is good
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for any man. Moreover, when you are above fifty you are no longer as
quick at learning languages. How many years would it take me to get a
sufficient command of Russian to be able to turn a phrase and to be slightly malicious without being outright offensive? No, I did not want to go
to Russia.
Even less did I want to be put in the position of having favors bestowed
upon me by the Russians or of having to refuse point-blank some position
of importance which they might wish to offer to me. I did not want to incur the favor of the Russians, but I did not want to antagonize them either. After devoting some thought to this dilemma, I decided that the best
way for me to keep out of trouble was to stick to the truth and thereby to
arouse the suspicion of the Russians.
I did not have to wait long for an opportunity to implement this plan of
action. The next morning at Brookhaven I was interrogated by a Russian
official. In the beginning his attitude was rather benevolent. Almost the
first question he asked me was why I had not worked in the field of atomic
energy prior to the Third World War. When I truthfully said that I had
five good and valid reasons and named them one by one, he took them
down in shorthand, but the longer I talked the more incredulous he looked.
It was obvious that he felt himself unable to believe what I was saying to
him. Realizing that my method worked, I answered all his questions as
truthfully as I possibly could and then signed the transcript at the end of
the interview.
I was called back for further interrogation in the afternoon; this time
it was an older Russian scientist who was known to me by name, but
whom I had not previously met. He told me that he had asked to see me
because he had read the transcript which I had signed in the morning. He
said that the Russian scientists had followed with great interest the articles I had written before the war, and he quoted to me passages from articles entitled "Calling for a Crusade" and "Letter to Stalin" which I had
published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists in 1947. This pleased me

very much. He went on to say, however, that these articles showed an almost incredible degree of naivet6 and were models of un-Marxian writing.
He acknowledged that they were free from any anti-Russian bias and told
me that the Russian scientists had formed the opinion that I had not been
working in the field of atomic energy before the Third World War because
I had not wanted to make bombs that would be dropped on Russia. He
said that he regretted that I had not given this as my reason, that he wanted to give me an opportunity to revise the answers which I had given, and
that he was prepared to tear up my signed statement then and there,
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though by doing so he would be sticking his neck out, since he would be
acting against regulations.
I thanked him for his kindness and told him that I had merely told the
truth which, unfortunately, was not within my power to change; and there
then ensued a most interesting and protracted conversation about the intrinsic value of truth. Since what he told me was told in confidence and
might get him into trouble if revealed, I do not feel free to record it here.
The war crimes trials opened about one month later at Lake Success
and I was-apparently as a special favor-among the first to be tried. I
was charged by the prosecutor, a Russian, first of all with having tried to
induce the United States government to take up the development of
atomic energy in a meeting held on October 21, 1939, i.e., at a time when
the war in Europe was still an imperialist war, since Germany had not attacked Russia until 1941.
I was also charged with having contributed to the war crime of dropping an atomic bomb on Hiroshima. I thought at first that I had a good
and valid defense against this latter charge, since I had warned against
the military use of the bomb in the war with Japan in a memorandum
which I had presented to Mr. Byrnes at Spartanburg, South Carolina, six
weeks before the first bomb had been tested in New Mexico.
But unfortunately this memorandum, which Mr. Byrnes had put into a
pocket of his trousers when I left him, could not be located by Counsel for
the Defense either in the files of the State Department or in the possession
of any of the Spartanburg cleaners who might have kept it as a souvenir.
Mr. Byrnes was himself under indictment and was not called as a witness.
Excerpts from the memorandum which were published in the fall of 1947
in the '3ulletin of the Atomic Scientists were stricken from the record on the
ground that the parts of this memorandum which were omitted from the
publication for reasons of secrecy might have contained the opposite of
what the published part of the document appeared to indicate.
Under these circumstances I had to fall back for my defense on a petition which I had circulated in the Uranium Project at the University of
Chicago immediately after the testing of the bomb in New Mexico and
which asked the President to withhold his approval of a military use of the
bomb against the cities of Japan. The prosecutor moved, however, that
this document be stricken from the record on the ground that it was not
transmitted by me to the President directly, but was rather handed by
me to the head of the project, who forwarded it through the Manhattan
District of the War Department, headed by General Groves. The prosecutor said that I, Szilard, should have known better than to agree to such
a method of transmittal.
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Having rested my defense I was now free on bail. Since I was not permitted to leave Lake Success I was spending my time there listening to the
trials of the statesmen and scientists. In spite of the seriousness of my own
situation, I found it difficult sometimes to refrain from joining in the
laughter which frequently interrupted the proceedings.
As a prelude to the Nuremberg trials, war crimes had been defined
with the collaboration of the United States, represented by Justice Jackson of the United States Supreme Court. The "violations of the customs of
war" had been defined as a war crime at that time. "Planning a war in
violation of international agreements" had been also defined as a crime.
The first statesman to be tried on charges arising from the bombing of
Hiroshima was Mr. Stimson, and he was tried on his own admission contained in an article which he had published in i947 in Harper's.The prosecution pointed out that the "defense" put forward by Mr. Stimson in that
article was untenable. Mr. Stimson's point was that, had the bomb not
been used, millions would have perished in an invasion of Japan. The
prosecutor, a Dutchman, quoted from a memorandum prepared after the
surrender of Japan by the United States Strategic Bombing Survey which
showed that the United States could have won the war against Japan
without invasion, just by sitting tight, since Japan was essentially defeated before the bomb was dropped on Hiroshima. He further quoted
passages from the book Secret Mission, by Ellis M. Zacharias, published
in 1946, which showed that Japan's desperate position must have been
known to Mr. Stimson, since it was fully disclosed in the reports prepared
by the United States Naval Intelligence.
Counsel for the Defense, however, submitted a deposition obtained
from the British Secretary of War in order to prove that secretaries of war
never based decisions on reports prepared by the Naval Intelligence.
"Mr. Stimson," so Counsel for the Defense said, "should not be reproached for acting as all Secretaries of War in all English-speaking countries have acted at all times."
The presiding judge, in summing up, disregarded the arguments presented by both the prosecution and the defense and took the line that prior
to the Third World War it was not customary to drop atomic bombs on
towns and cities, and that such a "violation of the customs of war" was a
war crime which could not be justified on the ground that the government
which committed it hoped that by doing so, it would bring the war to a
speedier conclusion.
It was expected that Mr. Stimson would be found guilty on his own admission but that he would be reprieved primarily because of his article
published in Foreign Affairs in 1947 in which he commented on the for-
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eign policy of the Truman administration. It was generally considered
that in 1947 his was a voice of reason and moderation in the midst of general confusion.
Mr. Truman was charged with the "crime" of actually ordering the
bombing of Hiroshima. At first, Counsel for the Defense took the line that
at the time when the definition of war crimes was made public at Nuremberg, Mr. Truman was at sea-in the literal sense of the term. He was on
board a battleship on his way back from Potsdam and did not have opportunity adequately to study the text of the Nuremberg Declaration prior
to the bombing of Hiroshima. This plea was rejected by the court on the
ground that those who were sentenced to death and executed at Nuremberg could-if they were alive-use much the same type of argument in
their defense.
Subsequently, Counsel for the Defense took the line that Mr. Truman
was not guilty because he had not acted on his own but had merely followed advice given to him and that, so to speak, he had been merely following orders. In proof of this the defense read into the record a magazine
article published by Garbatov in Russia in 1947 which asserted that Mr.
Truman had always been taking orders from one boss or another. This
article had drawn a protest from the American ambassador at the time of
its publication.
Having had little luck with any of his "lines," Counsel for the Defense
raised the questions why the use of an atomic bomb should be considered
as a "violation of the customs of war" any more than the use of a virus
that killed children. But the presiding judge ordered his remark stricken
from the record, saying that this was the trial of Harry S. Truman and
not of Somebody Else and that since Mr. Truman was not accused of having ordered the use of a virus in warfare, nothing relating to any virus
could possibly be relevant to his defense.
It was generally expected that Mr. Truman would be found guilty but
it was rumored that there were powerful Russian influences at work to
have him reprieved. There were all sorts of guesses as to what the reasons
of the Russians may have been, and some thought that they favored Mr.
Truman on account of his supposed Wall Street connections, since the
Russians were known to nurture a secret admiration for Wall Street. I,
myself, believe that the reason of the Russians may have been political
and rather difficult to guess in detail without knowing on which of their
misconceptions it was based.
The next to be tried was Mr. Byrnes, who was not only accused of being
responsible for the decision of using the atomic bomb against Japan, but,
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above all, was accused of having advocated a war against Russia "in violation of international agreements" in his book Speaking Frankly, which
appeared in 1947. The British prosecutor quoted from page 203 of the
first edition:
... I do not believe the Red Army would try to hold permanently all of Eastern
Germany. However, if I misjudge them, and they do go to the point of holding Eastern
Germany and vetoing a Security Council Directive to withdraw occupation forces, we
must be prepared to assume the obligation that then clearly will be ours. If our action
is to be effective, we must be dear in our minds and must make it dear to all that we
are willing to adopt these measures of last resort if, for the peace of the world, we are
forced to do so.
On this passage Mr. Byrnes was most severely cross-examined by the
prosecutor. He was asked whether he was aware of the fact that the
United States ratified the Charter of the United Nations at the time when
Mr. Byrnes himself was Secretary of State. He was asked whether he was
aware of the fact that by doing so the United States undertook the solemn
obligation of refraining from war and that, under Article 5i of the Charter,
the United States merely retained the right of waging war in case of an
armed attack. He was asked whether the mere refusal of Russia to leave
the territories which she had occupied after the Second World War could
be construed as an armed attack. He was asked whether he could suggest
any way of interpreting what he had been saying on page 203 of his book
other than as advocating that the United States ought to violate her
solemn obligation under the Charter and wage an illegal war against Russia in case Russia should refuse to settle on the terms set by the United
States government.
Counsel for the Defense replied that he wished to elucidate the meaning
of the passage "measures of last resort" quoted by the prosecutor from
Mr. Byrnes' book. At a press conference following shortly the publication
of his book, Mr. Byrnes himself, had explained this passage-so Counsel
for the Defense said. "There is no suggestion as to whether such collective
action should be persuasion, economic, or military action," Counsel quoted. "Clearly," Counsel said, raising his voice a little, "if Mr. Byrnes had
had military action in mind, he would have spoken of measures of very last
resort and not merely of measures of last resort." "British statesmen," he
said, looking sharply at the prosecutor, "may indulge in understatements,
but that is no reason for accusing my client of one."
The prosecutor replied that Mr. Byrnes had condemned himself by the
very words quoted by the defense, for by virtue of those words Mr.
Byrnes had admitted that the term "measures of last resort" meant either
persuasion or military action. "I am not conversant with American law,"
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he said, "but surely in England a man who publicly proclaims that he is
going to get hold of something that is in the possession of his neighbor
either by persuasion or by pulling a gun on him is persuaded to go to
jail."
At this point, Counsel for the Defense submitted evidence to show that,
two weeks before the outbreak of the Third World War, Mr. Byrnes had
sent a memorandum to the President of the United States warning against
any agressive act on the part of the United States Armed Forces that
would result in war. The prosecutor's motion that this memorandum be
ruled out as evidence was upheld by the presiding judge on the ground
that if inconsistency were admissible as a defense at the trial of a statesman, then no statesman could ever be convicted as a war criminal and the
statesmen would enjoy an immunity not shared by the other defendants.
All of us who attended his trial were unanimous in our praise of Mr.
Byrnes for the patience and firmness he displayed. Of course, if sentence
had been passed and executed, he would have lost his life; but as is generally known, no sentence was ever passed on Mr. Byrnes or any of the
rest of us. The first Russian appeal for help reached the United States
Public Health Service one week after Mr. Byrnes rested his defense.
just what happened will never be known with certainty. This much is
clear, that the vast quantities of vaccine which the Russians held in readiness to safeguard their own population against the virus were absolutely
without any effect. In the laboratory tests such vaccine had proved to be
ioo per cent effective; something must have gone wrong in the changeover from pilot plant operation to mass production, and soneone must
have forgotten to check the product for its effectiveness. Since the engineer in charge of the production plant at Omsk perished in the disorders
which broke out after over half of the children of the town had died, and
since all records of the production plants were destroyed in the fire, we
shall never know just what had gone wrong.
The terms of the post-war settlement which had been reached within
two weeks of the Omsk riots were in every respect very favorable to the
United States and also put an end to all war crime trials. Naturally, all of
us who had been on trial for our lives were greatly relieved.

